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Dangerous Yardstick? Early Cost Estimates and
the Politics of Financial Management in the First
Decade of the National Health Service
TONY CUTLER*
The object of this paper is to throw light on an apparent paradox in the financial
history of the British National Health Service (NHS) in, broadly, its first decade.
After the first two fiscal years of the Service a regime of tight expenditure restraint
was imposed. This reflected a perception ofNHS spending as excessive and subject
to insufficient control.' In the first volume of his official history of the Service,
Charles Webster has referred to the "atmosphere of retrenchment" dominant in the
1950s;2 but the first authoritative investigation of expenditure trends in the NHS,
that of the Guillebaud Committee (1956), came to a quite different conclusion. It
stated that it could not recommend any means which would "reduce in a substantial
degree the annual cost of the Service".3
This raises the question ofhow such differentjudgements could be arrived at. The
thesis advanced here builds on an observation by Webster, referring to expenditure
restraint on the Service in its first decade, that "the NHS struggled along in an
atmosphere ofsuspicion in government quarters, the main objective foundations for
which were the unrealistically low speculative estimates for the cost of the new
service made before its inception".4 Webster does not specify any particular estimates
nor does he develop his characterization of them as flawed. I believe that he was
correct to stress both the influence ofearly cost estimates and their weakness. Such
estimates served as pervasive but also dangerous expenditure yardsticks which
sustained an unrealistic conception of NHS expenditure as actually or potentially
out ofcontrol.
* Tony Cutler, PhD, School of Management, National Health Service 1958-1979, London, The
Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Stationery Office, 1996, p. 5.
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on the first draft of this paper; to Anne Hardy HMSO, 1988, p. 399.
and Caroline Tonson-Rye for their editorial 3Report of the Committee of Enquiry into
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This paper is divided into four parts: the first looks at how the politics of NHS
finance has been discussed in the historical literature on the period, and examines
the questions which this literature has inadequately addressed; the second considers
a key early estimate, that given in the 1944 White Paper, A national health service,5
and traces its relationship to the first key post-war estimate, that contained in the
Financial Memorandum to the NHS Bill of 1946;6 the third shows how these early
estimates functioned as de facto yardsticks in debates on NHS expenditure under
both Labour and Conservative governments; the fourth examines some crucial flaws
in the two early estimates and seeks to establish that they could not serve as a
realistic basis forjudging expenditure trends in the post-war Service. The conclusion
discusses some of the implications of the use of this problematic yardstick.
Historians and the (Early) Politics of NHS Expenditure
In the first two fiscal years ofthe NHS, expenditure was well in excess ofestimates.
In 1948/9 NHS gross expenditure for Great Britain exceeded the estimate by 39 per
cent; and in 1949/50 it was 27.5 per cent higher than the estimate.7 These cost over-
runs triggered what Webster has termed "the crisis of expenditure", and the first
volume of his official history of the Service charts in detail the conflicts over both
the interpretation of NHS spending trends and what response should be made to
them under the 1945 to 1951 Labour administrations.8 However, historians have
also pointed to restraint on NHS expenditure extending throughout the first decade
of the Service.
This emphasis on financial control was manifested in a perceived need closely to
monitor expenditure trends. Under Labour this role was assumed by a Cabinet
Committee, which first met in April 1950.9 Under the Conservatives it was the
responsibility ofthe Guillebaud Committee set up in 1953.1' Concern with the control
ofexpenditure is, ofcourse, not synonymous with restraint ofexpenditure. However,
Webster's reference to retrenchment during the 1950s is supported by analysis of
NHS expenditure trends which set them in a broader historical context. Thus an
expenditure series in constant (1985) prices constructed by John Appleby indicates
an increase in out-goings in real terms of 20.2 per cent over the period 1950/1 to
1959/60.11 Toputthesefiguresinlonger-termperspective, theyarebroadlycomparable
with those under the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Thus Appleby's series
indicates that, from 1979/80 to 1988/9, real NHS spending in the UK rose by 18 per
cent.12
5Ministry of Health/Department of Health for and R Lowe, Welfarepolicy under the
Scotland, A national health service, Cmd. 6502, Conservatives 1951-1964: a guide to documents in
PP 1943-44, VIII. the Public Record Office, London, Public Record
6'Financial memorandum' to the National Office, 1998, pp. 46-7.
Health Service Bill (1946), PP 1945-46, III. " Calculated from J Appleby, 'Government
'Both figures calculated from Webster, op. funding of the UK National Health Service: what
cit., note 2 above, p. 135. does the historical record reveal?', J. Health
8Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, ch. 5. Service Res. Policy, 1999, 4 (2): 79-89, p. 84.
'See ibid., pp. 157-66. Calculated from ibid.
"On the political background to the
appointment of the Committee, see P Bridgen
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However, while the historical literature has pointed to both the aim and the
achievementofrestraintinNHSexpenditure from 1950to 1960, ithas also questioned
the need for such restraint. In this respect it has echoed the finding ofthe Guillebaud
Committee. The Committee decided to contract out its investigation to the National
Institute for Economic and Social Research."3 The work was undertaken by Brian
Abel-Smith, then at the National Institute, with Richard Titmuss acting as "con-
sultant",'4 and the resulting monograph was published as The cost of the National
Health Service in England and Wales. This research, which was crucial in informing
the findings ofthe Committee, showed a picture ofmodest expenditure growth and
that the NHS was absorbing a falling share of national income during the years
1949/50 to 1953/4.1' Later historical work has pointed to similar conclusions. Thus,
for example, Jim Tomlinson has shown how limited were the demands of the NHS
on key materials and labour in the early years of the Service.'6 Nevertheless, while
the literature has suggested that anxiety over the rate ofgrowth ofNHS expenditure
in this period was misplaced, it has not addressed how such concerns were created
and sustained. In this respect, aside from Webster's reference to the influence of
early cost estimates discussed above, there has been no attempt to account for this
pervasive concern withexpenditure control. To examine theimplications ofWebster's
argument it is necessary to begin by analysing a key expenditure estimate made
before the beginning of the NHS, that in the 1944 White Paper and its relation to
the estimate given in the Financial Memorandum to the NHS Bill of 1946.
The 1944 White Paper and Financial Memorandum Estimates
In thethird section itwillbeargued that the 1946 Financial Memorandum estimate
for NHS expenditure operated as a yardstick for critics ofthe level ofNHS spending
under both Labour and Conservative governments in the first decade ofthe Service.
Here I examine this estimate and its relation to the earlier one in the 1944 White
Paper, A national health service. It has generally been agreed that a major impetus
to wartime planning of a national health service stemmed from the Beveridge
Report.17 Beveridge elaborated three "assumptions" which were seen asunderpinning
the proposals for the reform of social security. One of these, "assumption B", was
for "comprehensive health and re-habilitation services for prevention and cure of
disease" to be "available to all members of the community".'8
Although this "assumption" provided a stimulus to wartime health planning, the
Report contained no detailed proposals on the anticipated structure of a future
'3PRO MH 137/26, 'Committee ofEnquiry 1945-1951', Twentieth Century Br Hist., 1995, 6
into the Cost of the National Health Service', GC (2): 194-219, pp. 200, 205-6.
1953), 1st meeting, 13 May 1953. 17 F Honigsbaum, Health, happiness and
'4Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 207. security: the creation ofthe National Health
15See B Abel-Smith and R Titmuss, The cost Service, London and New York, Routledge, 1989,
ofthe National Health Service in England and ch. 4.
Wales, Cambridge University Press, 1956, pp. 60, 1 Social insurance and allied services,
63. Beveridge Report, Cmd. 6404, PP 1942-43, VI,
16See J Tomlinson, 'Welfare and the economy: para. 301.
the economic impact of the welfare state
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Table 1
Comparison of expected cost of a National Health Service in the 1944 White Paper and the
Financial Memorandum to the National Health Service Bill, 1946, estimate for England and
Wales*
Service area 1944 White Paper 1946 Financial
estimate Memorandum
estimate
Hospitals £80m £87m
General medical; pharmaceutical; dental and £41m £45m
ophthalmic
Local authority services £l0m £12m
Superannuation/compensation £8m
Total £132m £152m
Sources: Ministry of Health/Department of Health for Scotland, A national health service, Cmd. 6502,
1944, PP 1943-44, VIII; and Financial Memorandum to the National Health Service Bill (1946), PP
1945-46, III.
* The 1944 White Paper assumed that a significant part ofthe funding for a national health service would
come from local taxation, £48 million or 36 per cent in the case ofEngland and Wales; and £5.4 million
or 34 per cent in the case of Scotland. The overall figure given in the White Paper was, however, the
anticipated total public funding for the future service, see Ministry of Health/Department of Health for
Scotland, A national health service, Cmd. 6502, 1944, PP 194344, VIII, pp. 84-5.
health service. Wartime planning was thus designed to elaborate this structure and
this resulted in the 1944 White Paper. As part of this exercise a cost estimate was
prepared and included in the White Paper.'9 Table 1 shows the White Paper estimate
for England and Wales broadly disaggregated by the major service areas and this is
set alongside the corresponding figure given in the Financial Memorandum to the
NHS Bill of 1946, the first public post-war estimate ofthe expected cost ofthe NHS.
A comparison of the two aggregate figures shows that the Financial Memorandum
estimate was 15 per cent higher than that given in the White Paper. However, this
exaggerates the increase in financial resources for the Service anticipated in the later
estimate. As the table indicates, the White Paper figure was understated because it
included no estimate for superannuation or compensation, but such a figure was
included in the later estimate. There was, however, an anticipated increase in public
funding of hospitals of £7 million. But this has to be set in the context of a key
change in the policy on hospitals. In the White Paper it had been envisaged that
voluntary hospitals would remain independent from the state but would receive
payments for the provision of beds.20 In October 1945, however, Aneurin Bevan
proposed to take the voluntary hospitals into public ownership2' and this policy was
'9Ministry of Health/Department of Health Aneurin Bevan on the National Health Service,
for Scotland, op. cit., note 5 above Appendix E. Oxford, Wellcome Unit for the History of
20Ibid., p. 23. Medicine, 1991, pp. 31-9.
21 Bevan's memorandum 'The future of
hospital services', is reprinted in C Webster (ed.),
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Table 2
Gross and net expenditure estimates for the NHS in the Financial Memorandum to the NHS
Bill and the NHS (Scotland) Bill, 1946
Gross expenditure Non-exchequer Net expenditure
estimate funding sources estimate
estimate
England and Wales £152.Om £42.Om £l1O.Om
Scotland £22.Om £5.5m £16.5m
Great Britain £174.Om £47.5m £126.5m
Sources: Financial Memorandum to the National Health Service Bill (1946), PP 1945-46, III; Financial
Memorandum to the National Health Service Bill (Scotland) (1946), PP, 1945-46, III.
approved by the Cabinet.22 In the structure recommended in the White Paper it was
assumed that, in addition to public funding, voluntary hospitals would continue
to have a source of income from voluntary contributions.23 Yet, nationalization
presupposed a shift to public funding, and the "additional" £7 million was seen as
replacing such voluntary funding. In a discussion of the difference between the two
figures, this was made clear by H H George, the official principally responsible for
preparing the health estimates forEnglandandWales, who indicated thattheincrease
of £7 million in public funding was to be explained by the "cessation of voluntary
contributionstovoluntaryhospitals".24Thismeantthatthe totalresources anticipated
for hospitals would be the sum estimated in the 1944 White Paper. Thus, if an
adjustment is made for both these aspects, the difference between the two estimates
is only £5 million or 6 per cent of the original White Paper figure. In effect, the
Financial Memorandum estimate was a minor incremental adjustment to the White
Paper figure.
Two further points need to be made. Table 1 gives the 1946 estimate for England
and Wales but the Financial Memorandum to the NHS (Scotland) Bill contained a
parallel estimate of £22 million,25 thus the Great Britain estimate was £174 million.
The Financial Memorandum also presented expenditure in "gross" and "net" terms.
The former referred to total expected expenditure on the Service whereas the latter
deducted contributions to its funding from non-exchequer sources, principally the
part of National Insurance Contributions that was allocated to the funding of the
NHS. These non-exchequer sources were estimated to contribute £47.5 million, hence
the "net" figure of £126.5 million. The overall "gross" and "net" figures for Great
Britain are presented in Table 2. These figures were to be significant as the yardsticks
used by critics concerned with trends in NHS expenditure.
22PRO CAB 128/1, 'National Health Service', 2"'Financial memorandum' to the National
18 Oct. 1945. Health Service (Scotland) Bill, (1946), PP
23Honigsbaum, op. cit., note 17 above, ch. 14. 1945-46, III.
24PRO T 161/1243, H H George to E Hale, 7
Dec. 1945.
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The Financial Memorandum Yardstick
The links between the White Paper and the Financial Memorandum estimates
being established, the aim of this section is to show how the similar expenditure
figures that they generated operated as an important yardstick in constituting a
"problem" of NHS expenditure in the first decade of the Service. Two different
periods are considered: the first two fiscal years of the Service; and the end of
its first decade, when the Guillebaud Report triggered a new debate on NHS
expenditure.
Labour and the Crisis ofExpenditure
The cost overruns prompted an important debate within the Labour Cabinet and
one of Bevan's principal opponents was Herbert Morrison, the Lord President of
the Council. His hostility to Bevan was fuelled by earlier disagreements over the
appropriate structure for afuture health service. Morrison hadfavoured theretention
of local authority control of the hospital service, whereas Bevan, as pointed out
above, had successfully pressed for its "nationalization".26
Morrison expressed his a priori suspicion of Bevan by urging the need for an
inquiry into the NHS as early as January 1949.27 In addressing the issue of the
appropriate level of NHS expenditure, Morrison's advisers in the Lord President's
office had regular recourse to the Financial Memorandum figures as a standard.
Bevan's estimate for NHS gross outlay for England and Wales for 1949/50 was £312
million.28 This was regarded as excessive on, inter alia, the following grounds: "the
cost for 1949/50 is ... expected to be more than twice the figure given [to] the public
with the Bill (£152 million)".29 As previously indicated, the £152 million figure
was the gross expenditure estimate for England and Wales cited in the Financial
Memorandum.
The Financial Memorandum yardstick also figured significantly in proposals for
cuts in NHS spending during this period. A proposed response to the cost overruns
was to impose a limit on NHS expenditure, and this raised the question ofwhat this
should be. In debates on an expenditure limit for 1950/51, Morrison was advised
that "ifa ceiling is to be proposed ... it is difficult to see how on national economic
grounds anything above £300 millions can possibly be regarded as tolerable".30 The
£300 million referred to here was a "net" figure for Great Britain and its significance
can be grasped if it is related to the net figure proposed by the Minister of Health.
This was £393 million,3' so the logic of the proposed ceiling was a cut of around
one-third in proposed expenditure levels. In justifying such a substantial reduction
the argument used was that "this would still give the Health Services well over
26On this debate, 'National Health Service', 30PRO CAB 124/1188, E M Nicholson to
op. cit., note 22 above. Herbert Morrison, 'National Health Service', 11
27Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 134. March 1950; K Laybourn, The evolution of
28Ibid., p. 136. British social policy and the welfare state:
29PRO CAB 21/2035, J A R Pimlott to c. 1800-1993, Keele University Press, 1995,
Herbert Morrison, 'National Health Service', 6 p. 232.
Jan. 1949. 3' Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 136.
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double the figure (£126 millions) on the basis of which the Government decided to
go forward with the Service in 1946". The reference was, again, to the Financial
Memorandum, as the £126 million was the expected "net" expenditure figure for the
health services in Great Britain given in that document.32
The Post-Guillebaud Debate
The use of early expenditure estimates as yardsticks can also be discerned at the
end of the first decade of the Service. Following the Suez crisis, new pressures for
cuts in social services and in NHS expenditure operated. However, a distinctive
feature of this period was that the Guillebaud Report allowed for arguments which
set NHS spending in a broader macro-economic context. Thus, in January 1957,
Dennis Vosper, the Minister of Health, sought to temper proposed cuts by pointing
out that NHS expenditure was falling as a share of national income.33 However,
such an approach was strongly resisted by the Treasury, and in a draft statement
for the Chancellor (Lord Thorneycroft) of February 1957 the yardstick of the
Financial Memorandum was again used: "we have given anxious consideration to
the growing cost of the National Health Service. When it was established it was
expected to cost [a total ofl £175m a year. By 1949/50 the cost had risen to £450m
... in 1957/8 the gross cost of the Service will be £690m".34 Here the £175 million
refers to a rounding of the Great Britain gross expenditure estimate in the two
Financial Memoranda as indicated in Table 2. Right through the first decade ofthe
Service, therefore, the estimate in the Financial Memorandum to the NHS Bill for
England and Wales (itself substantially derived from the 1944 White Paper) was
given a quasi-contractual status.35 To use Webster's term, "suspicion" derived from
the fact that the health ministers had signally failed to keep to this initial estimate.
Naturally, this involved an implicit assumption that the estimate was reasonable,
and that the fact that it had been exceeded to such a degree was an indicator ofthe
failure properly to control health expenditure. However, as shown above, Webster
characterized early estimates as "speculative" and "low". Ifthis were the case, then
3 The emphasis in this article is on the
importance ofthe earliest official estimates of the
cost of a national health service. The estimates
for fiscal year 1948-9 were revised upwards from
those given in the Financial Memorandum so the
1948/9 estimate for England and Wales was
£198.4 million or £264.5 million on an annualized
basis. The cost overruns relative to this estimate
and that in 1949/50 were, of course, highly
significant in the "crisis ofexpenditure" but, as
the article seeks to demonstrate, the (lower)
original estimates served as a pervasive and even
more exacting yardstick.
33PRO CAB 129/85, C (57), 'National Health
Service', memorandum by the Minister of Health,
30Jan. 1957.
3'PRO T 227/485, unsigned, 'Draft statement
on the estimates', 19 Feb. 1957.
"The emphasis on initial estimates as a
yardstick point to two weaknesses in the
Treasury's approach to the control of public
expenditure in this period. Firstly, there was no
effective scrutiny of the basis of the estimates
because of the limited research capacity of the
Treasury, see, for example, H Heclo and A
Wildavsky, The private government ofpublic
money, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1981, p. 42.
Secondly, there was a bias to "economy" which
engendered resistance to setting public spending
in a macro-economic context and to seeing
positive benefits for such spending. On the
latter see R Lowe, 'The core executive,
modernisation and the creation of PESC
1960-64', Public Administration, 1997, 75 (4):
601-15.
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the "problem" lay not so much in the divergence between actual expenditure and
the early estimates, but rather in the estimates themselves. If they had seriously
miscalculated likely NHS spending they had created a yardstick to which it was
impossible to conform. The next section evaluates this standard.
The Flawed Yardstick: The 1944 White Paper Estimate
Evaluation of the cost estimate in the 1944 White Paper focuses on three areas:
the dental and ophthalmic estimates; the pharmaceutical cost estimates; and the cost
estimates for the hospital service. These were selected because of their significance
for differences between the service costs estimated in the 1944 White Paper and the
expenditure out-turns in the first fiscal year of the Service.
The dental and ophthalmic services are grouped together because public sector
provision for adults in these areas came through the National Health Insurance
(NHI) system. In the White Paper, dental expenditure was expected to be £10 million
per annum and ophthalmic expenditure £1 million per annum.36 As the NHS started
in July 1948, figures for the first fiscal year have to be annualized to achieve
comparability with the White Paper figures. If this is done, the (annualized) out-
turn for 1948/9 for the dental service in England and Wales was £29 million, and
for the ophthalmic service £19.9 million,37 sums far exceeding the White Paper
estimates.
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the 1944 White Paper did not give a separate
figure for expected costs under the new service. However, such a breakdown was
given in draft versions ofthe Financial Appendix to the White Paper. These indicate
that the annual cost of pharmaceuticals in England and Wales was expected to be
£6 million per annum.38 The Hinchcliffe Committee, which investigated the costs of
the pharmaceutical service in England and Wales and reported in 1959, did not give
a cost figure for the first fiscal year ofthe Service. However, a Public Record Office
(PRO) file gives an estimate of£19.5 million for that part-year or £26 million on an
annualized basis,39 and by 1949/50 annual expenditure had increased to £31.7
million.40
Hospitals were expected to be the most expensive part of the future service.
The White Paper anticipated that the hospital service in England and Wales
would cost £80 million or 61 per cent of total expenditure (see Table 1). As
previously noted, if an anticipated £7 million from voluntary hospital contributory
income is added to this figure, the total financial resources for the hospital service
in England and Wales was expected to be £87 million. The (annualized) expenditure
36Ministry of Health/Department of Health 38PRO MH 77/28, H H George to John
for Scotland, op. cit., note 5 above, Appendix Maude, 'First draft of the financial appendix', 5
E. Nov. 1943.
37Calculated from A Cutler, 'The cost of the 39See, PRO MH 137/80, 'Pharmaceutical
National Health Service: problem definition and services (England and Wales)', Nov. 1958.
policy response 1942-1960', unpublished PhD 4 Ministry of Health, Final report ofthe
thesis, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Committee on Cost ofPrescribing (Hinchliffe
Medicine, 2000, p. 184. Committee), London, HMSO, 1959, para. 51.
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on the hospital service in 1948/9 was £193 million.4' Hospitals were thus significant
for two reasons: there was a substantial difference between the estimate in the
White Paper and the out-turn for the first fiscal year of the Service, though it was
proportionately smaller than those for the dental/ophthalmic and pharmaceutical
services; and hospitals were expected to constitute the most expensive part of
service provision.
The Dental and Ophthalmic Estimates
To understand the problems posed by the White Paper estimates in the dental
and ophthalmic areas, it is necessary to look at some key expenditure estimates in
wartime health planning that preceded the White Paper.42 The first major estimate
produced by the Ministry of Health during wartime was titled 'Approximate cost
of the main health services'. In that document a figure of £30 million is given for
the total cost of a dental service under a future service, of which £20 million is the
cost to "public funds".43 To set these figures in context, it is necessary to recognize
that, at this stage, the dental service was envisaged as providing for the adult
population (those over 15 years old) only. Provision for under-1Ss was to be through
the School Medical Service and local authority clinics. The source for the figure in
the 'Approximate cost' estimate was a document of 21 July 1942 entitled 'Cost of
dental treatment'. In the latter, two take-up possibilities for dental services were
used: these predicted that 10 or 20 per cent of adults would use the dental service
annually." The figure given in the 'Approximate cost' document corresponded to
the cost if the 20 per cent take-up rate materialized.45 The cost to public funds was
anticipated to be lower than the total cost because, although treatment would be
free, provision of dentures would involve a charge.
However, a major reduction occurred in a later important draft estimate entitled
'Finance of new health scheme'.' This gave a cost to public funds figure of £10
million, half the earlier estimate, and this is also the figure cited in the 1944 White
Paper.47 The cut is not explained in this estimate, but a likely reason was a tension
in dental policy. John Welshman has pointed to a "sea change" in official attitudes
to dental provision in wartime planning, which contrasted with those prevailing in
4' Calculated from Cutler, op. cit., note 37
above, p. 185.
42Prior to the development ofwartime
planning there was an important estimate of the
cost of health services pre-war. This was included
in the Political and Economic Planning's Report
on the British health services (London, PEP,
1937). This gave a figure for the "cost of ill
health" of £185 million. This might appear to be
another argument against the estimate given in
the 1944 White Paper. However, it is important
to bear in mind that the two sources are not
comparable. For example, £99 million of the PEP
figure referred to funding from voluntary or
private sources such as fees to doctors for private
treatment; and part of the state funding referred
to cash benefits under the NHI scheme rather
than specific health service provision, see ibid.,
pp. 387-91.
4 PRO MH 80/24, unsigned, 'Approximate
cost of the main health services', 29 July 1942.
"PRO MH 80/24, unsigned, 'Cost of dental
treatment', 21 July 1942.
"'Approximate cost', op. cit., note 43 above.
" PRO MH 80/26, H H George to John
Maude, 'Finance of new health scheme', 24 Sept.
1943.
Ministry of Health/Department of Health
for Scotland, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 82.
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the inter-war period.48 An important element in inter-war thinking was that low
levels oftake-up in the School Medical Service were a function ofparental ignorance
or negligence. The "sea change" led to a tendency to see low take-up as rooted in
structural problems such as poverty.49
This shift in approach meant that public policy should be geared to encouraging
the use of the dental service; an attitude reflected in the Report of the [Inter-
Departmental] Committee on Post-War Dental Policy, a committee ofcivil servants
chaired by the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry ofHealth, Sir John Maude. The
Report linked restricted use of the service with the lack of a preventative approach
to dental care. However, this preventative ideal was also seen as constrained by the
supply of dentists. The Committee argued that 12,000 registered dentists were in
practice and that while "this is adequate to present effective demand for dental
treatment" it was "inadequate to secure any substantial improvement in the dental
condition ofthe nation".50
The Committee therefore advocated a policy of concentrating resources on
"priority" groups: nursing and expectant mothers, schoolchildren and adolescents
(15- to 17-year-olds). A general service with a preventative bias was initially to
be applied to these groups and, with respect to the rest of the population, the
Committee argued that "stimulation of demand by education methods, by the
provision of clinics and by the extension to the general population of 'dental
benefit' or its equivalent must be timed to keep pace with the actual increase in
the supply of dentists".5'
This approach was supported by the relevant ministers, Henry Willink, the
Minister of Health, and Thomas Johnston, the Secretary of State for Scotland.
In a joint memorandum to the War Cabinet, they argued that "we have little
doubt that ... the proper course is to concentrate our efforts on the teeth of
the rising generation, and for that purpose to amplify and improve existing
services dealing with mothers and pre-school children and to extend that service
to adolescents".52 This not only endorsed the priority group policy but was seen
as having implications for costs. Thus the shift from a comprehensive service
was said to mean that estimates can be "substantially cut for the time being".53
With respect to the ophthalmic estimate, the 'Approximate cost' document cited
an estimated total cost of £4 million per annum and a cost to public funds of £2
million. The source of this estimate was a document entitled 'Ophthalmic benefit'.'
The lower cost to public funds reflected the expectation that half of the cost of
spectacles was to be paid by the user. However, there was an important difference
between the two estimates. As noted, the 'Approximate cost' estimate was premised
on a 20 per cent take-up rate, three times the take-up rate under National Health
4' J Welshman, 'Dental health as a neglected 5' Ibid.
issue in medical history: the School Dental 52PRO MH 80/25, 'Memorandum to the war
Service in England and Wales 1900-1940', Med cabinet by the Minister of Health and the
Hist., 1998, 42: 306-37, p. 322. Secretary of State for Scotland', 2 Feb. 1943.
49Ibid. 53 Ibid.
50PRO MH 80/35 'Report of a committee on 54PRO MH 80/35, 'Ophthalmic benefit',
post-war dental policy', 11 Feb. 1943. unsigned, 21 July 1942.
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Insurance (7 per cent). In contrast, the ophthalmic estimates assumed that there
would be no increase in take-up but that any increase in cost would flow solely from
the higher population coverage. This, under NHI coverage, for ophthalmic benefit
was 11.8 million and the cost to public funds was £630,000." The 'Ophthalmic
benefit' document assumed a coverage of46 million or 3.9 times the coverage under
NHI. Ifthe NHI cost is grossed up to the new population coverage this would give
£2.3 million, or £2 million if rounded down.
There was, however, a reduction in the ophthalmic estimate which parallels that
for the dental service discussed above. The 'Finance ofnew health scheme' estimate
also reduced the figure by half, giving a cost to public funds of £1 million.56 Again,
itis likely that the reason forthe cut was the adoption ofa restricted service reflecting
resource constraints and, in the 1944 Commons debate on the White Paper, Johnston
stated, "we propose that there shall be an ophthalmic service as soon as the required
increase ofpeople in the profession can be obtained".57 The 1944 White Paper used
the £1 million estimate.58
The serious problems with the White Paper dental and ophthalmic estimates
relate to two issues. The first was that certain policy premises underlying the
estimates were under constant debate and subject to modification; the second
was that there were inconsistencies in the approach to the estimates in the two
areas.
The policy question relates to two further issues: the question ofcharges; and that
of the scope of an immediate post-war Service. The assumption of a charge for
appliances meant that the cost to public funds ofthe dental and ophthalmic services
was expected to be substantially reduced. This assumption stemmed from the
Beveridge Report where it was argued: "To ensure careful use, it is reasonable that
part of the cost of renewal of dentures should be borne by the person using them
... the same holds true of optical appliances".59 However, a wartime planning
document discussing dental policy pointed to the tension between this position and
that ofdivorcing access to the service from ability to pay.' Naturally, such a tension
meant that a policy of charging could be abandoned on the grounds that it acted
as a deterrent to service use and raised awkward administrative problems of what
did or did not constitute "misuse".61 This line of argument suggested that the
provision of these services should be free at the point of use. However, there were
two major expenditure implications. The first was that the totality of service
expenditure would fall on public funds. The second, and arguably more important
feature, was that the terms of access to the Service would now be different from
those which applied under NHI, since there would be no charge to the user.
5 Dental and ophthalmic benefits under NHI "Thomas Johnston, Hansard, 1943-44, vol.
could only be claimed if the individual was a 398, 17 March 1944, col. 632, my emphasis.
member of an approved society which had an 58Ministry of Health/Department of Health
actuarial surplus, thus coverage was lower than for Scotland, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 82.
for medical and pharmaceutical benefits, 59Social insurance and allied services, op. cit.,
discussed later, which were provided for all those note 18 above, para. 435.
covered by NHI. 60PRO MH 77/124, S F Wilkinson, 'Dentistry
56'Finance of new health scheme', op. cit., in the NHS', third paper, 21 June 1944.
note 46 above. 61 Ibid.
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The second source of policy ambivalence was whether a universal service ought
to be provided at the outset of the NHS or whether a more limited service should
be offered. A precedent for the former was provided by Beveridge, since his report
had envisaged "a comprehensive national health service" which was to include access
to "dental, ophthalmic and surgical appliances" (and thus, perhaps by implication,
dental and ophthalmic treatment) "for every citizen".62
It was argued above that the most plausible reconstruction ofthe sharp downward
revision of the dental estimates was the "priority group" policy, and that similar
restrictions on the ophthalmic service were also anticipated. However, with respect
to dental provision, this approach was effectively reversed by the recommendations
of the Teviot Committee. Appointed in April 1943, part of its terms of reference
was to report on "the progressive stages by which, having regard to the number of
practising dentists, provision for an adequate and satisfactory dental service should
be made available for the population".63 Such terms implied a "priority group"
policy. However, the interim report, published in November 1944, recommended
that a dental service be provided for the whole population. This was argued on two
grounds: it was seen as integral to a comprehensive medical service,64 and was
necessary to stimulate an awareness ofthe importance ofdental health amongst the
population.65 The latter concern was in line with the view that dental services were
being under-utilized; it was noted earlier that the priority group policy went along
with downplaying the stimulation of demand for the non-priority group. However,
a reversal would have a clear financial corollary. If a priority group policy was the
basis for the White Paper cost estimate figures, then the abandonment of such a
policy would make these estimates untenable since a universal, not a restricted, basis
of access was now presupposed.
However, ifcharges and tensions between a restricted and a universal service were
crucial to policy shifts that rendered the White Paper assumptions redundant, there
were also important issues relating to the Ministry's approach to cost estimates in
these two areas.
As previously indicated, the estimation oflevels ofdemand were inconsistent. The
dental estimates projected much higher levels than those occurring under NHI. No
analysis is given in the dental estimate documents ofthe effective selection ofthe 20
per cent rate. However, there could be two reasons for expecting an increase in
demand. The first was the policy of seeking to stimulate demand as part of a
preventative policy. The other was that there would also be a substantial call for
new dentures. Such a backlog could be related to treatment costs in the inter-war
period. Thus, for example, Roger King has argued that full dentures cost as much
as 10 guineas, and this meant that "many people either did not bother ... or
continued to use a set which had become a poor fit".'M
62 Social insurance and allied services, op. cit., 6' Ibid., para 72.
note 18 above, para. 427. 65Ibid.
63 Interim report ofthe Inter-Departmental 6 R King, 'Dentistry in the new NHS of
Committee (Scotland) on Dentistry, Cmd. 6565, 1948', Dental Historian, 1994, no. 26: 11-21,
PP 1943-4, III, para.1. p. 16.
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However, while there were plausible reasons for planning for an increased demand
for dental services, in the case of ophthalmic treatment quite different criteria were
used. The estimate simply took NHI expenditure levels (and hence, by implication,
demand levels) at the endofthe inter-war period and extrapolated them to the whole
population. Naturally this assumed that NHI take-up levels would remain constant,
the increase of cases would merely be a result of the total population coverage.
However, there was also reason to expect a backlog effect similar to that in the
dental service. For example, there was a parallel to the ill-fitting dentures tolerated
because of the cost of the replacement. NHI coverage for ophthalmic benefit was
limited to less than 12 million people. Thus most of the market for spectacles was
not via the recommendation of ophthalmologists or sight-testing opticians but
through "sixpenny service at Woolworth's" or "itinerant vendors or second-hand
from market stalls".67 It would, therefore, have been realistic to plan for a substantial
increase indemand stemmingfromtheabandonment ofinferiorspectacles. Naturally,
if this were to happen, the assumption of a constant NHI level of service take-up
grossed up to a larger population would be highly inaccurate.
The Pharmaceutical Estimates
In contrast to the other two areas considered in this paper, the documentary
evidence for the derivation of the pharmaceutical cost estimates is very sparse.
Pharmaceutical figures were bracketed under the total cost of the general medical
service. While substantial attention was devoted to estimating the expected level of
general practitioner pay, pharmaceutical costs received no detailed attention.68 In
estimates of February 1942 and May 1943, they were put at £5 million per annum
and the figure given in the 1944 White Paper was £6 million per annum.69
The lack ofexplicit documentation makes it impossible definitely to conclude how
these figures were reached, but a plausible basis for them can be suggested. In the
case of the ophthalmic estimates, the final figure assumed that expenditure would
rise pro rata with population coverage, and it is possible that a similar procedure
was used in the case ofpharmaceuticals. In 1938, population coverage for NHI (and
thus for the general medical and pharmaceutical services) in England and Wales was
18,883,000, and the cost of the pharmaceutical service was £2.4 million.70 The
expected (universal) coverage for a future national health service in England and
Wales was 41,250,000, or roughly 2.2 times the NHI coverage. If NHI expenditure
is grossed up by the same amount, this gives a figure of £5.3 million. Thus, while
67Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 368. 70Twentieth annual report ofthe Ministry of
6 For the considerable work which went into Health, 1938-39, Cmd. 6089, PP 1938-39, XI,
discussions of GPs' pay, see PRO MH 80/31. pp. 142, 215, 273-4, 297-8.
69For a discussion of these figures, see Cutler
op. cit., note 37 above, ch. 2.
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any reconstruction has to be tentative, it can be said that the figure falls within the
£5-6 million range of the wartime planning estimates.
As noted, this was an area in which very substantial cost overruns occurred. To
understand the possible reasons for this it is necessary to look at two major drivers
of pharmaceutical costs: the demand for general medical services and the (derived)
demand for drugs; and the cost per prescription, which itself reflects the mix of
drugs prescribed and the terms under which they were supplied to a national health
service. If the working hypothesis is adopted that extrapolation was used to arrive
at the estimate, then it is possible to analyse the relative importance ofthese different
cost drivers.
In 1938, 68,256,000 prescriptions were issued in England and Wales under the
NHI general medical service,71 and a projection for universal population coverage
wouldgive an expected annualfigure of 149millionprescriptions. The PRO statistical
series on pharmaceutical services shows 141 million prescriptions issued in 1948/9,
or roughly 189 million on an annual basis.72 This suggests that demand would have
been under-estimated by around 25 per cent.
However, given that expenditure for the first two fiscal years of the service was
running at around four to five times the 1944 White Paper estimate, prescription
costs were clearly the central determinant in the overrun. The use of extrapolation
would assume that the average cost per prescription would remain unchanged at the
1938 level of 8d. However, by 1948/9 it was 2s. 9d.73 The increase in average
prescription costs were the crucial factor. In turn, this raises the question of how
far the very low early estimate in this area reflected weaknesses in financial control
or was attributable to factors that were difficult to predict.
In the case ofthe demand estimate, extrapolation would involve a straightforward
problem: that the population covered by NHI was radically different from that
to be covered under a national health service, and that there was a particularly
striking contrast on gender lines. In 1938, 12.5 million men in England and
Wales were covered for NHI, 63 per cent ofthe male population; the corresponding
figures for women were 6.3 million and 29 per cent.74 Here lay the potential for
a "backlog" effect in which, particularly, women who had been excluded from
general medical provision, free at the point of use, took advantage of the new
conditions of access. This might have been anticipated, given the evidence available
on long-term health problems amongst working-class women.75 The Ministry of
Health annual report for 1948/9 examined this issue by comparing consultation
data for the same periods in 1946/7 under NHI, with those in 1948 under the
71 Ibid, pp. 142, 215. 74NHI coverage figures from from the
72'Pharmaceutical services (England and Twentieth annual report, op. cit., note 70 above,
Wales)', Nov. 1958, op. cit., note 39 above. pp. 273-4, 297-8; population figures from B
7 1938 costs calculated from the Twentieth Mitchell, British historical statistics, Cambridge
annual report, op. cit., note 70 above, pp. 142, University Press, 1988.
215; 1948/9 costs from 'Pharmaceutical services 7 For a classic account, see M Spring-Rice,
(England and Wales)', Nov. 1958, op. cit., note 39 Working-class wives: their health and conditions,
above. 2nd ed., Virago, 1981 (1st ed. 1939).
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NHS. This showed that male consultation rates (between the ages of 16 and 64)
in 1948 were slightly lower than those under NHI in 1946, with a slight rise in
consultation rates for men over 65. In contrast, the 1948 consultation rate for
women aged 16 to 64 was just under 10 per cent higher than the 1946 figure;
and for women over 65 it was 25 per cent higher.76 Clearly extrapolation meant
a failure to pick up this "backlog" effect.
On the issue of average prescription costs, a crucial feature was the pattern of
innovation in the drug market. In this respect, the post-war period exhibited a
distinctive character when contrasted with the inter-war period. As Webster has
pointed out, the post-war years "coincided with an explosion in the production of
new, effective and often expensive vaccines and drugs".77 This radical shift had a
number of consequences. When the NHI ended in 1947, proprietary preparations
accounted for 7 per cent of prescriptions and 24 per cent of ingredient costs. Even
then, average prescription costs were nearly three times those at the end ofthe inter-
war period. By 1950, proprietary drugs accounted for 18 per cent of prescriptions
and 44 per cent of ingredient costs; by 1956, the respective figures had increased to
40 per cent and 66 per cent.78
Little attention was devoted to the pharmaceutical estimates compared with that
undertaken on GP pay. This may have reflected assumptions regarding the relative
cost ofthesedifferent parts ofthegeneralmedicalservice. Wartimeestimates operated
on the assumption that the pharmaceutical service would cost around one-fifth of
the cost of GP pay;79 by 1956/7 the costs of the pharmaceutical service exceeded
expenditure on GP pay.80 Given the dynamic character of post-war pharmaceutical
developments, early estimates in this area were likely to be problematic. As in the
case of demand, but with more drastic effects, the use of extrapolation ran the risk
ofexposing the estimate to the major cost overruns.
The Hospital Estimates
Problems of forecasting also applied to the White Paper estimate of expenditure
on hospitals. Acute hospitals were particularly significant, being seen as likely to
absorb most resources under a future health service. An insight into the problems
posed by the White Paper estimate of hospital costs is contained in an important
contemporary critique by Dr A H T Robb-Smith, then Director of Pathology
at the Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford, which was published in the Lancet in
76These percentages were calculated from data 79 'First draft of the financial appendix', 5
in Report ofthe Ministry ofHealthfor the year Nov. 1943, op. cit., note 38 above.
ending 31st March, 1949, Cmd. 7910, PP 1950, 80Hinchliffe Committee Report, op. cit., note
XI, p. 194. 40 above, para. 56.
"Webster, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 13.
78'Pharmaceutical services (England and
Wales)', Nov. 1958, op. cit., note 39 above.
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Table 3
Reconstruction of Robb-Smith's calculation of expected cost per bed in hospitals (England
and Wales) based on data in the 1944 White Paper, A national health service
Hospital Type Bed Numbers Grant Local or Implied cost per inpatient
voluntary year/week
funding
Municipal 210,000 £21m £17m
Voluntary 100,000 liom £6m
Total 310,000 £31m £23m £174 4s per year;
£3 7s per week
Source: A H T Robb-Smith, 'The conjectures ofAppendix E', Lancet, 2 April 1944, i: 545-6.
April 1944.81 Robb-Smith's article focused on the estimates for acute hospitals
and, while it lacked some crucial details, it highlighted fundamental flaws in the
White Paper estimate.
Robb-Smith sought to construct a reasonable set of assumptions which would
allow a figure for expected general (acute) hospital unit costs (i.e. cost per inpatient
week) to be calculated. The White Paper included 210,000 "other municipal beds"
in the new Service, and these general hospital beds were to be funded by a grant of
£100 perbedper annum.82 However, local authorities were alsoexpected tocontribute
to the financing ofhospital provision through local taxation. The White Paper cited
an expenditure figure for such municipal hospitals in 1938 of £14.6 million.83 Total
local authority hospital spending in 1938 was stated to be £35.7 million. The White
Paper expected this to rise to £41.6 million under the new Service.84 Robb-Smith
argued that, if an assumption was made that expenditure on "other hospitals and
institutions" was the same proportion of total expenditure as in 1938, then it could
be expected to rise to £17 million under the new Service (£14.6 million multiplied
by 41.6/35.7).85
Voluntary hospital grants would also be at £100 per bed per annum, and it was
anticipated that 100,000 beds would be available under the new Service in this sector.
However, to obtain a figure for the total funding ofvoluntary acute provision under
a new service, an additional assumption was required regarding the likely level of
voluntary income used to support this provision. Robb-Smith assumed that a further
81 A H T Robb-Smith, 'The conjectures of London includes no references to work on NHS
Appendix E', Lancet, 2 April 1944, i: 545-6. costs after the Lancet article discussed here. See
While Robb-Smith's critique is of great Cutler, op. cit., note 37 above, p. 155.
importance in highlighting the problems of the 82Ministry of Health/Department of Health
hospital estimates in the White Paper, he did not for Scotland, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 82.
return to this issue in his later career. He died in 83 Ibid., p. 81.
January 2000, and his curriculum vitae included 84 Ibid.
in his papers held at the Wellcome Library in 85Robb-Smith, op. cit., note 81 above, p. 545.
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£6 million would come from this source.86 He made no attempt tojustify this figure,
but it is broadly consistent with the available data. In 1938 total voluntary hospital
income in England and Wales was £12.1 million with £4.8 million coming from
voluntary gifts and investments, and £7.3 million from payments for services.87 The
largest part of the latter (£6.3 million) was accounted for by patient payments and
revenue from subscription schemes.88 Robb-Smith cited a unit cost figure of "£3 per
week". In fact, as Table 3 indicates, the implied cost per patient week was somewhat
higher than this at £3 7s per week. Robb-Smith claimed that such an expected unit
cost would be inadequate "unless the majority of beds" under the new service were
of "public assistance" institution standard, which he assumed to be radically at
variance with the objectives of the White Paper.
To evaluate this argument it is necessary to go back to the concept of service
standards set out in the White Paper, and to discuss the implications of such
standards for hospital costs. The White Paper begins with the following statement
"the Government have announced that they intend to establish a comprehensive
health service.... They want to ensure that in future every man, woman and child
can rely on getting all the advice and treatment and care which they may need in
matters of personal health; that what they get shall be the best medical and other
facilities available".89
The White Paper does not directly exemplify the acute hospital provision which
could be seen as "the best". However, there are some indications in the text which
allow an idea of the kind of institutions which served as a de facto model. Thus in
Appendix (A), which discusses "existing health services", stress is laid on the
variability ofstandards ofprovision. With respect to the voluntary sector, there were
"larger and powerful general hospitals of the kind familiar in London and certain
of the other big cities with distinguished specialists and consultants available with
first-class modern equipment and treatment facilities . . . drawing their patients from
areas wide afield-as leading institutions in the medical world".9 In contrast
there were also "small 'cottage' hospitals" in the voluntary sector "really
functioning as local nursing homes".9' Similar sharp contrasts were discerned in
the municipal sector. When discussing general municipal hospitals, the White
Paper referred to institutions "at every stage of development from sick wards of
an institution for the aged or chronic sick to the most modern and up-to-date
hospitals".92
Given such contrasts it might be reasonable to take as exemplars of "the best",
the major London teaching hospitals to which the White Paper refers; and, in the
municipal sector, the acute hospitals of the London County Council (LCC). The
latter are relevant because the LCC had gone furthest in appropriating beds from
86Ibid. 'Ibid., p. 55.
87R Pinker, English hospital statistics, 9' Ibid.
1861-1938, London, Heinemann, 1966, p. 149. 92Ibid., p. 56.
88Ibid.
89Ministry of Health/Department of Health
for Scotland, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 5, my
emphasis.
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Table 4
Costs per inpatient week, London teaching hospitals (1938) and London County Council
general hospitals (1937/8)
Hospital Available beds Percentage of Cost per inpatient
occupied beds week
Charing Cross 290 88.24 £4 lOs ld
Guy's 687 84.80 £6 3s 8d
King's College 382 86.44 £5 6s 2d
London 885 84.14 £5 12s 6d
Middlesex 601 95.02 £5 6s 7d
Royal Free 312 90.64 £5 Os Od
St Bartholomew's 726 89.42 £5 1ls 5d
St George's 330 85.03 £5 Os lld
St Mary's 460 84.76 £4 lls 3d
St Thomas's 659 90.12 £5 2s 3d
University College 592 91.49 £4 14s 5d
Westminster 257 88.99 £5 18s 5d
LCC (general hospitals) 17,931 87.30 £4 2s 3d
Sources: British Hospitals Association, Hospitals Yearbook 1940, London, British Hospitals Association,
1940; London County Council, Annual report of the Council 1937, volume IV, Public health (hospital
finance), London County Council, 1938.
the Poor Law and had been identified as attaining standards comparable with leading
voluntary sector hospitals.93
Such considerations raise the question of the costs in such institutions, and Table
4 shows costs per inpatient week for the London teaching hospitals for 1938 and
the average cost perinpatient week for the LCC general hospitals in 1937/8. However,
before comparing these figures with the White Paper cost norm it is important to
state a caveat. The White Paper figures referred to the totalexpected cost ofhospital
provision, i.e. covering both inpatients and outpatients. The figures in Table 4 refer
to inpatient costs alone. There is insufficient data to allow for reliable adjustments
of the figures in the table to reflect outpatient demand but, clearly, the figures
underestimate the total cost of provision.
What is clear from the table is the extent of the divergence between the de facto
White Paper cost norm and the cost per inpatient week in London municipal and
voluntary hospitals. Equally, it is worth noting the occupancy rates in these hospitals.
A relatively high inpatient cost per week could reflect very low occupancy levels. In
such cases various fixed or semi-fixed costs are spread over a small patient population.
Furthermore, thevoluntaryhospital costdatafor 1938 reveal that hospitalscombined
9 For example, by 1938 only 1.8 per cent of
LCC beds were still under the Poor Law, the
average for county boroughs in that year was
42.5 per cent. Calculated from Twentieth annual
report ofthe Ministry ofHealth, op. cit., note 70
above, p. 246.
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very low occupancy rates with high costs per inpatient week. For example, Weir
Hospital and Twickenham St John's were small institutions with 30 and 34 beds
respectively, with costs per inpatient week of£4 14s 7d and £4 5s 6d.9' They, however,
operated with occupancy rates of 24.3 and 27.1 per cent respectively.95 In contrast,
the lowest occupancy rate among the London teaching hospitals in 1938 was 84.1
per cent, and the LCC general hospital average was 87.3 per cent. Thus the unit
costs in these hospitals reflected the costs of medical activity, not the effects of
operating well below capacity.
There was another important question regarding likely acute hospital costs, that
of the consultant service. No direct mention of this was made in the White Paper
financial estimate. It was, however, particularly crucial for voluntary hospitals.
Consultant posts in the latter were honorary. The White Paper envisaged that
voluntary hospital participation in the new service would be linked with substantial
state funding, with the corollary that consultants would be paid in a future national
health service. Such pressures had already emerged before the Second World War.
Thus, as voluntary hospitals became increasingly dependent on providing services
to patients either paying fees or covered by subscription schemes, the BMA pressed
for payment for voluntary hospital consultants.
Robb-Smith sought to calculate the cost of a consultant service based on the
assumption of 17 consultants per 100,000 population or a population ratio of
5,900:1 consultant. He also assumed that each consultant would require an
assistant.' In his view, consultants should earn £2,000 a year, assistants £1,000.
Robb-Smith's assumptions on consultant ratios were higher than those adopted
by a Ministry wartime planning estimate in which George Godber, Principal
Regional Medical Officer, drew on hospital survey work in the Sheffield and
North Midlands area. He argued that 454 consultants would be required in the
area, a population ratio of 8500:1.97 Godber did not discuss the issue of assistants,
but if Robb-Smith's assumption of one consultant to one assistant is accepted
as well as his expected pay levels, then the two estimates would involve the
expenditure levels shown in Table 5.
Taken together, the various strands of evidence considered so far suggest that
there was powerful support for Robb-Smith's claim that expected acute hospital
costs were too low, given the health policy objectives of the White Paper. In effect,
the White Paper assumed a cost per bed in general hospitals of roughly £3 7s per
week. As has been demonstrated (see Table 4), the lowest cost per inpatient week in
a London teaching hospital, Charing Cross, was 34 per cent higher than this norm
and the highest, Guy's, was 84 per cent higher. In the case of the LCC, general
hospitals' average costs were 22 per cent higher.
Robb-Smith also attempted to estimate a more realistic figure. He argued that "it
is unlikely that the average cost per bed can be less than £3 15/- per week" but
this figure was "exclusive of the consultant service". As noted, he thought that
9 British Hospitals Association, Hospitals 96Robb-Smith, op. cit., note 81 above, p. 545.
Yearbook 1940, London, British Hospitals PRO MH 80/27, George E Godber,
Association, 1940, p. 129. 'Consultants', 7 March 1944.
"Ibid., p. 106.
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Table 5
Estimates of the cost of a consultant service (England and Wales)
Estimate Consultant: Consultant Consultants' Assistants' Total cost
population numbers pay pay
ratio
Robb-Smith 1:5900 7000 £14m £7m £21m
Godber 1:8500 4850 £9.7m £4.8m £14.5m
Sources: A H T Robb-Smith, 'The conjectures ofAppendix E', Lancet, 2 April 1944, i: 545-6; PRO, MH
80/27, George E Godber, 'Consultants', 7 March 1944.
£21 million would be an appropriate figure for such a service. At the £3 15s per bed
hospital provision was estimated by Robb-Smith to cost £58.5 million and £21
million for the consultant service, a total cost of £79.5 million.98 This contrasted
with the £48 million ofpublic funds suggested in the White Paper (or £54 million if
the additional £6 million voluntary income was included), an alternative cost of
roughly £5 per bed per inpatient week (£80 million divided by 310,000 beds).
Interestingly, this was also the figure cited by the local authority representatives in
the Ministry wartime estimates: a Memorandum from the threemajorlocal authority
associations in June 1943 argued that costs per inpatient week in an "up-to-date and
well equipped hospital" would not be "less than £5 per week".9 The Memorandum
gives no basis for the £5 figure and, as was indicated earlier, Robb-Smith's consultant
servicecostsinvolvedstaffinglevelshigherthanthosethoughtappropriateinGodber's
estimate. However, it is also worth noting that his initial cost per inpatient week,
£3 15s, was itself low, certainly in the context of the London experience. Thus a
reasonable case could be made for a £5 norm. In certain respects it might be thought
conservative, but even this implied general hospital expenditure substantially higher
than that stipulated in the White Paper.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this paper two views of the trajectory of NHS expenditure
during the first decade of the Service were contrasted. The Guillebaud Committee
concluded that it could find no scope for substantial cuts in Service expenditure.
This conclusion was related to a trend of modest increases in NHS expenditure in
real terms and of Service expenditure falling as a share of national income. It
98Robb-Smith, op. cit., note 81 above, p. 545. Municipal Corporations and the London County
'PRO MH 80/31, Memorandum by the Council, 'Proposed financial basis of the new
County Councils Association, the Association of health services', 21 July 1943.
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contrasted with the view, under both Labour and Conservative governments in the
first decade of the Service, that NHS expenditure posed a political problem.
Under the influence of Abel-Smith and Titmuss, the Guillebaud Committee
looked at the trajectory of NHS expenditure in terms of constant prices and the
share of national current and capital expenditure taken by the NHS. But official
policy used a different yardstick. Thus it was pointed out that the 1946 Financial
Memorandum, itself a modest reworking of the 1944 White Paper estimate, was
a point of reference not only in the financial crisis of the first two fiscal years
of the Service but also at the end of the first decade of the Service. With respect
to the latter period, Paul Bridgen and Rodney Lowe have pointed to the
continued relevance of early estimates where there was "continual harking back
to the original estimated cost"."°
Equally, it was argued that the weakness in the estimates meant that they provided
a gross under-estimate of the likely cost of a future health service in the light of
data available at the time they were prepared. The potential political dangers ofthis
yardstick were seen by Robb-Smith. Thus, in March 1944, he wrote to the Minister
of Health, Willink, regarding the White Paper cost estimates. Referring to them as
"quite inadequate", he went on to argue, "my concern is ... having mentioned a
figure in the White Paper it may be difficult to persuade the legislature to accept a
considerable increase in this figure".'10
This letter received considerable attention from officials. In part, the discussion
was concerned with detailed aspects of Robb-Smith's critique. However, the central
objection to his argument was not so much that his alternative estimates were
unsound, but rather that he had misunderstood the status of the figures in the
financial appendix. Thus John Pater argued, "It is made quite clear in the Appendix
that all it does is to make a very tentative estimate of the cost of the service in the
early years. But Mr. Robb-Smith seems to regard it as an authoritative final
pronouncement on what the Government is prepared to spend on a comprehensive
service".102
This view was central to the reply to Robb-Smith, which Michael Reed,
Willink's private secretary, wrote on behalf of the Minister: "Mr. Willink feels
that you may be reading into Appendix E rather more than is justifiable. The
estimates in Appendix E are not a statement of what the Government are
prepared to spend but an attempt to suggest what the actual costs might be in
the early years of the service".103
It has been argued in this paper that Robb-Smith was prescient on the political
dangers posed by the White Paper estimate. In contrast to the official view, this
estimate was regularly taken as an "authoritative pronouncement" of what the
Service ought to cost. The White Paper itself raised the issue of the variation in
standards ofprovision. However, at the end ofthe first volume ofhis official history
' Bridgen and Lowe, op. cit., note 10 above, 102PRO MH 77/84, J E Pater to H H George,
p. 43. 1 April 1944.
101 PRO MH 77/84, A H T Robb-Smith to 103 PRO MH 77/84, M Reed to A H T Robb-
Henry Willink, 23 March 1944. Smith, 11 April 1944.
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ofthe Service, Webster observed that "the financing ofthe health service made little
allowance for the correction of inherited problems such as maldistribution and
general deficiency in standards".'04 Arguably, early estimates ofthe likely cost ofthe
NHS played a significant role in providing a questionable standard by which
parsimony was regularly justified in the first decade of the Service.
'"Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 395.
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